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Abstract 
 
We investigate the roles of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity on crime. Our 
analysis reconciles low crime rates with light punishments in self-governed communities (Ostrom, 
1990), using formal punishments to deter crime (Becker, 1968). We use a novel trial dataset on water 
stealing from a self-governed community in Mula, Spain. We present a model with predictions 
consistent with farmers' behavior in Mula: (i) judges trade off crime deterrence and insurance, 
recognizing that minimizing crime could be socially inefficient; (ii) punishments depend on the 
defendant's and victim's characteristics; (iii) recidivists are punished harsher than first time offenders 
for the same crime. 
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“[Jean Valjean] asked himself whether human society could have the right to force its members to 
suffer equally in one case for its own unreasonable lack of foresight, and in the other case for its 
pitiless foresight; and to seize a poor man forever between a defect and an excess, a default of 
work and an excess of punishment.” 
Victor Hugo, Les Misérables. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Classical criminology analysis, since the seminal work by Becker (1968), argues that harsh 
punishments are the best crime deterrent. This is the case if the objective of the social planner is to 
minimize crime and punishment is costless. There are situations, however, where allowing specific types 
of crimes can increase social welfare by providing, for example, insurance of last resort. Consider the 
case of farmers who need to irrigate their trees, but might be liquidity constrained (we describe these 
farmers in more detail later). These farmers had two options to irrigate their trees: buy water at the 
auction, or irrigate without permission thus committing a crime. A poor, liquidity constrained farmer who 
has never stolen water may face an unusual temporary negative shock, such as a drought. A harsh 
punishment would deter the farmer from stealing water, but the farmer's trees would wither. A mild 
punishment, would allow the poor farmer to steal water during the negative shock, saving the farmers' 
trees. If the punishment is always mild, though, even farmers not subject to the negative shock would 
steal water. However, punishing recidivists more harshly will deter opportunistic farmers from stealing 
water today, when they do not need it. Such a progressive punishment system, which accounts for the 
criminal history of the individual, is more efficient than a system that always imposes a harsh 
punishment, because the option to steal water during a drought, acts as an insurance of last resort for 
liquidity constrained farmers. 
In this article, we investigate the roles of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity in 
the determination of crime and welfare using a novel dataset of trials from a self-governed community of 
farmers.1 Ostrom (1990, 1992) emphasized that, in self-governed communities, low crime can be 
sustained with mild formal punishments if informal punishments, such as shame, humiliation, and social 
ostracism, are present. As Ostrom (1990, p. 69) emphasizes: 
“For at least 550 years, and probably for close to 1,000 years, farmers have continued to 
meet with others sharing the same canals for the purpose of specifying and revising the rules 
that they use, selecting officials, and determining fines and assessments.” 
In our setting, however, small fines coexist with low crime rates without the need of informal 
punishments.2 We present a dynamic model, described below, where recidivists are punished harsher than 
first time offenders. This allows us to reconcile low crime rates with low punishments in our self-
governed community, similar to Ostrom (1990), using a dynamic framework with formal punishments, 
similar to Becker (1968) and the literature that followed. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
emphasize the role of punishment progressivity in self-governed communities. 
																																																																		
1 By punishment progressivity we mean that recidivists are punished harsher than first time offenders for the same crime. The crimes analyzed in 
this article refer to property theft (stealing water as explained below) as opposed to, e.g., murder. 
2 Although informal punishments are not observed in our setting, our analysis remains valid absence these informal punishments. 
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Our dataset contains information from trials of farmers charged with violating the bylaws of the self-
governed community of Mula (Murcia), Spain, from 1851 to 1948. On October 2nd, 2009 The Council of 
Good Men (Tribunal de los Hombres Buenos), the Water Tribunal in Murcia, was inscribed on the 
Representative list of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by the United Nations (UNESCO, 
2009).3 The water tribunals in Murcia and Valencia, the two main cities in the region, were recognized as 
representing all the irrigation communities in the region, including the one we study in Mula. The tribunal 
provided justice when conflicts among farmers arose. Water rights in Mula, unlike in most towns in the 
area, were not attached to land rights. In the region, the scarce factor was water, not land. This 
circumstance created inequality between the (wealthy) owners of water rights, and the (poor) owners of 
land rights. Among the farmers, in 1955 over 90 percent of them owned their land (Donna and Espín-
Sánchez, 2018b). The system survived, however, for over seven centuries. Our analysis helps explain this 
extraordinary stability of the irrigation community in Mula. The criminal system combined protection of 
water and land property rights, with punishments that minimized crime while creating insurance of last 
resort for the farmers. 
Most of these conflicts resulted from farmers irrigating without the right to do so, reducing water 
available to other farmers. Both stealing water and detecting the theft were straightforward in this 
environment. Farmers could steal water by opening the gate of the canal next to their land, allowing the 
water to flow into their parcel. Moreover, monitors could easily identify an illegally-flooded parcel from a 
farmer who did not buy water for that specific day and time, conditional on rainfall. In this setting, a harsh 
punishment system, such as high fines or prohibition of future water purchases, would deter farmers from 
stealing water. Conversely, a mild punishment system, such as a small fee, would favor high crime rates. 
As noted by Glick (1967, p. 56), for Castellon: “the actual fines assessed were very low (a few pennies at 
the most) and also variable, depending on the gravity of the offense, on general economic conditions, and 
probably on the individual's ability to pay.” The punishment system in our empirical setting was 
characterized by three empirical regularities. First, judges imposed low punishments on poor farmers 
based on individual characteristics. Second, judges imposed low punishments for first time offenders. 
Third, judges' punishments were progressive, in that recidivists were punished more harshly than first 
time offenders.4 This system resulted in both small average fines and low crime rates, as discussed below. 
To analyze welfare, we present a model with rational and forward-looking farmers who respond to 
judges' optimal punishment in a dynamic setting. We introduce two features motivated by the empirical 
regularities of our setting. First, we allow a transitory individual state, unobservable to the judge, to be 
correlated with a public signal. The transitory individual state captures whether the farmer needs water, or 
is needy. The public signal captures the state of the environment, such as whether there is a drought or a 
dry month. Second, we introduce a persistent individual state. The persistent individual state captures 
																																																																		
3 Note that UNESCO translated the name of the tribunal as “Council of Wise Men” instead of “Council of Good Men,” which would be the 
proper translation. The distinction is important because the tribunal is not composed of Wise Men, but of farmers whose role is to increase welfare 
by being merciful, thus Good Men. A summary and video can be found in the UNESCO webpage, here. 
4 Judges have full discretion on the amount of the fines in the trials up to the maximum established in the ordinances, 25 pesetas in Mula, 
equivalent to a weekly wage. Fines were low, 5 pesetas on average, equivalent to a daily wage. In addition to the fine, the accused had to pay the 
value of the water stolen. The fine is not correlated with the value of the water stolen. 
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whether the farmer is dishonest, or greedy. Greedy farmers suffer less from punishment when they steal 
water. The judge is benevolent, rational, and forward looking. The optimal punishment imposed by the 
judge depends on the information available, which includes public signals, farmers' individual 
characteristics, and farmers' criminal history.5 The first feature of the model generates an optimal 
punishment that depends on individual characteristics. It rationalizes the first empirical regularity of the 
setting, that judges rarely impose harsh punishment to poor farmers. The second feature of the model 
generates punishment progressivity as an optimal punishment system. It rationalizes the second and third 
empirical regularities of the setting, that recidivists are punished more harshly than first time offenders. 
Consistent with the data in our setting, our model predicts that small average fines coexist with low crime 
rates, in contrast to typical criminology analysis using a static Beckerian framework. The low average fine 
is a weighted average of many small fines for first time offenders and a few large fines for recidivists. 
When a farmer is caught stealing the first time, the fine is low. However, the farmer loses the option value 
of stealing “for free” in the future, when the farmer may need the water the most due to a contingency, 
such as a drought. Losing this option value, acts as a harsh punishment, thus deterring crime. Our model 
also predicts that recidivists are more likely to be greedy than first time offenders. This is because the 
greedy type is permanent while the needy type is not. The main insight is that differences in water needs 
are “washed away” after a heavy rain, while differences in greed are not. 
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is to reconcile low crime rates with light punishments 
in self-governed communities (Ostrom, 1990), using formal punishments to deter crime (Becker, 1968). 
To do that, we bring together a novel dataset with a new model, where judges trade off crime deterrence 
and water insurance. We show that the predictions of the model are consistent with farmers' behavior in 
Mula. First, fines are larger during a dry month, when the benefits of stealing are higher. Second, fines are 
larger when the defendant has a Don honorific title, reflecting the lower probability of needing water.6 
Third, fines are lower when the victim has a Don honorific title, reflecting the lower damage inflicted to a 
Don, who typically has more water and a lower marginal return on it their larger supply of water. 
Related Literature 
Our work is closest to that of historians studying irrigation communities in Mediterranean Spain. 
Alberola Romá (2015), among others, argues that Wittfogel's (1957) theory of “hydraulic empire” does 
not apply to the irrigation communities in Mediterranean Spain. Glick (1967) studies irrigation 
communities in medieval Castellon. Garrido (2011b, 2012) studies the irrigation communities near 
Castellon, Borriana, and Villareal. Calatayud (2016) and Sanchis-Ibor (2016) study irrigation 
communities in Mediterranean Spain during the 19th century. These irrigation communities, and the one 
we study in Mula, were governed by (elected) local boards that assigned water rights and meted out 
punishments. Ostrom (1990, 1992) describes eight principles of good governance that self-governed 
																																																																		
5 Note that there are two dimensions of heterogeneity among farmers. We define efficiency based on their need of water, not on their greed. 
However, in equilibrium the optimal punishment punish greedy farmers more harshly. 
6 Don (male) or Doña (female) are an honorific title in Spanish. They are used with the person's name, e.g., Don Juan Zapata. Originally, they 
were reserved for the aristocracy in Spain. During the period under analysis the terms also encompassed high-rank civil servants, wealthy 
persons, or people with college degree. During our period of analysis, about 5-10 percent of the population was called Don/Doña. The term also 
encompassed high ranking civil servants, the wealthy, and the college-educated. Hence, it is believed that a Don never needed to steal water. 
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institutions should follow. However, as Garrido (2011a) notes, the Spanish orchards that make up the 
irrigation communities do not follow all Ostrom's principles. We contribute to this literature by studying 
an additional factor that explains the survival of the self-governed institutions for centuries: the criminal 
system. As Ostrom (1990, p. 69), emphasizes: “Despite this high potential for conflict-and its actual 
realization from time to time-the institutions devised many centuries ago for governing the use of water 
from these rivers have proved adequate for resolving conflicts, allocating water predictably, and ensuring 
stability in a region not normally associated with high levels of stability.”7  
Ostrom (1990) has extensively studied the benefits of self-governing institutions. The Hobbesian 
legal centralism theory has been also criticized by Ellickson (1991), among others. For example, there are 
situations in which people are not constrained by formal legal institutions (Posner, 2000), but rather by 
commonly agreed social norms. These situations usually arise because of incomplete rules, when the law 
does not specify all possible contingencies or a mechanism to certify them. The solution is then to allow 
flexibility on the judge's ruling. We explain that fines are lower than the maximum permissible in Mula 
using a mechanism similar to the one in Polinsky and Shavell (2000). In their case, the punishment could 
be reduced by considerations of fairness. Our analysis focuses on purely on efficiency. The optimal 
system, however, increases fairness while maximizing efficiency. In the presence of liquidity constraints, 
the market would not allocate water efficiently (Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2018b). The main 
contribution to this literature is to show how the system of self-governance, via elected judges, was 
efficient. Thus, it helps to explain the survival of these institutions for centuries, until today. It also helps 
to explain why these communities thrived in international markets throughout the 20th century. Garrido 
(2010) expands the argument by Morilla Critz et al. (1999) that early 20th century irrigation communities 
in Spain remained labor intensive. This is remarkable given the competition from (capital intensive) 
Californian producers in European markets. 
This article is also related to the literature in anthropology and sociology regarding irrigation 
communities. We believe the framework proposed here could be adapted to study such settings. We show 
that in the Mula irrigation community, the stability and fairness of the system is the result from formal, 
rather than informal, punishments. This is an important feature of our setting because informal 
punishments are difficult to measure.8 Gray (1963) studies an irrigation community in Tanganika, where 
only individuals with the highest status were guaranteed water rights. Individuals with no rights had to 
buy or steal water. If they were caught, the punishment was a flat fee. Gray (1963) also emphasizes that 
“since water theft is usually actuated by dire necessity there is little moral stigma attached to [it],” unlike 
other crimes. Mula farmers also faced little moral stigma for stealing water.9 Unlike Gray (1963), we find 
that higher-status individuals received heavier punishments than regular citizens. Self-governing 
																																																																		
7Glick (1967) uses two cross sections of fines (1443 and 1486), which are far apart, to cross check individuals. We use a continuous panel 
spanning a century, which allow us to follow individuals over time and check for recidivists. Crimes in Glick (1967) are more common than in 
our case. He finds recidivists within the same year, some of them committing multiple crimes in the same year, but none of them receives a large 
punishment. We do not find a recidivist committing a crime more than once in the same year. Finally, he finds no relation between the severity of 
the punishment and the socioeconomic status of the thief, contrary to our case. 
8This is not to say that informal punishments are not important in our or other settings. We believe they are, and they are typically complements 
to formal punishments. Thus, the existence of informal punishments would reinforce our claims. 
9Tan-Kim-Yong (1980) argues, however, that in Thailand, water thefts are treated as regular thefts. Thus, the lack of moral stigma does not apply 
to all irrigation communities in general. 
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irrigation communities also developed other ways for farmers to use water without paying for it. Allen 
(1965) emphasizes how the Chagga people, also in Tanzania, had “days of petition,” when farmers in dire 
need would ask water owners to use their water. Finally, even communities where theft was not 
uncommon might not have a specialized court, as Coward (1976) shows for Laos.10  
Pérez Picazo (2002) studies how conflict in Mediterranean's irrigation communities between farmers 
(owners of land) and Waterlords (owners of water rights) increased over the course of the 19th century. 
The increase in irrigable land, due to the construction of new dams, meant that in times of scarcity more 
farmers would not have enough water to irrigate their crops. Thus, during droughts, the level and 
volatility of prices rose. Although we focus on conflicts among farmers, not between farmers and 
Waterlords, we also study the effect of droughts on conflict. Libecap (2007) studies the conflict between 
farmers in Owens Valley and the city of Los Angeles, when the city bought the water rights from the 
farmers. The conflict deteriorated during the drought in the early 1920s. Hansen, Libecap and Low 
(2011) argue that climate change is reducing the supply of water and increasing its volatility. The effects 
will be felt more strongly in agriculture. We argue that a better understanding of conflict management on 
irrigation communities may help solve these conflicts in the future. More generally, we contribute to the 
growing economics literature on climate and conflict (e.g. Miguel et al, 2004; Bai and Kung, 2011; 
Chaney, 2013; Dell et al, 2014). 
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on crime deterrence.  When law enforcement is 
imperfect, two types of errors can occur: an innocent person may be convicted (false positive); or a guilty 
person may be acquitted (false negative). In our empirical setting, imperfect law enforcement arises due 
to law incompleteness or incomplete contracts. The goal of the law is to maximize welfare. However, 
since it is not possible to account for all possible contingencies in each case, and because judges' own 
information is imperfect, judges have some leeway to interpret the law. For example, a judge could 
decide not to punish a guilty farmer. Therefore, in our setting, the judge faces a tradeoff between false 
positives and false negatives, rather than minimizing crime. 
In the classic economic analysis of criminal behavior started by Becker (1968), criminal histories are 
irrelevant and there is lack of progressivity. A large literature in the economic analysis of crime has 
empirically studied the responsiveness of crime to the severity of criminal sanctions.11 There is a number 
of papers documenting that offenders or prisoners who face harsher sanctions are less likely to reoffend or 
be rearrested in certain contexts, such as three strikes laws (e.g. Ziming, Hawkins and Kamin, 2001; 
Helland and Tabarrok, 2007), clemency bills (e.g. Drago, Galbiati and Vertova, 2009), and using 
discontinuities in punishment sentencing (e.g. Hjalmarsson, 2009b).12 These deterrence effects, however, 
do not hold universally (e.g. Hjalmarsson, 2009a; Lee and McCrary, 2017). Chalfin and McCrary (2017, 
Section 4) attribute this to differences in the responsiveness to sanctions among offenders of different 
																																																																		
10In other settings, fines could depend on other observables. Sutawan (1980) argues that in Bali the closer is the subak (community) from the dam, 
the higher the fine. 
11See Cameron (1988), Marvell and Moody (1996), and Chalfin and McCrary (2017) for comprehensive reviews of the literature. 
12 Progressivity is also present in other setting, such as the “three strikes” policy in California. Punishment in these settings is typically costly (e.g. 
overcrowded prisons). In our case punishment is costless. 
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ages.13 They emphasize that “[to] date, the degree to which offenders are deterred by harsher sanctions 
remains an open question” (Chalfin and McCrary 2017, p. 32). Our contribution to this literature is to 
study a setting where we follow individual offenders who, upon being detected committing a crime, face 
different sanctions for the same crime based on the offender's criminal history. We do this in a setting 
where offenders are caught with certainty, thus holding fixed the probability of being caught. The 
particularities in our empirical setting allow us to hold fixed the crime committed, and to study the roles 
of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity in the determination of crime.14 The crime 
consists of stealing water at a given time. The individual characteristic is whether the offender is wealthy, 
as captured by the Don honorific title. Progressiveness arises because the judges update their beliefs about 
the offenders' type based on their criminal record. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND DATA 
“Whiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over.” 
Mark Twain 
In this section, we describe the historical background, trial data, and the water auction. We 
combine data from different sources for our analysis. Trial and auction data, the primary sources of data 
for this study, are obtained from the historical archive of Mula.15  
2.1. Institutions in Mula 
The institutions for water allocation in Mula come from the Reconquista (Rodríguez Llopis, 1998). 
After the conquest of the city, the Order of Santiago had absolute authority over Mula because the city 
was conquered by force.16 The Order of Santiago separated the ownership of land and water, creating a 
corporation, the Heredamiento de Aguas, to auction access to river water. The largest shareholder in Mula 
was the Marquis of Los Vélez.	Under these new Christian institutions, the owners of the water property 
rights, who we call Waterlords, were different than the farmers, who owned land. In Mula, the Waterlords 
established a corporation which, despite the many political changes that occurred in Spain, lasted until 
1966 (Espín-Sánchez, 2017). 
The Heredamiento de Aguas was divided into 832 dividend-paying shares. By contrast, all water 
owners had the same voting rights regardless of the number of shares they owned, i.e., the democratic rule 
was “one man, one vote.” After the corporation's bylaws changed in 1895, the new capitalistic rule 
allocated votes proportional to the number of shares. We do not observe a change in behavior after 1895. 
The water tribunals in Murcia and Mula were similar. In Murcia water was allocated using fixed 
quotas (tandas). In Mula water was allocated by a public auction (Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2018a). We 
use the auction prices as an indicator of the value of the water stolen. While all Murcia farmers have 
water property rights, in Mula some farmers had no water rights, i.e., they had to purchase water in the 
																																																																		
13 See Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018) for a recent study about the effect of punishment severity on jury decision making using historical data 
from natural experiments in London that resulted in a decrease in punishment severity. 
14 Our paper is also related to articles that focus on the economic factors related to crime, such as Machin and Meghir (2004), and Vickers and 
Ziebarth (2016). 
15 From the section Heredamiento de Aguas, boxes No.: HA 167, HA 168, HA 169 and HA 170. 
16 Note that this initial shock in institutions is similar to that in Chaney and Hornbeck (2016). 
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auction. There were approximately 500 farmers in Mula. Whereas virtually all of them owned the land, 
only about 200 farmers also owned water rights. An individual needed to own water rights, i.e., own one 
of the 832 shares in the corporation, to be a member of the Heredamiento and to be a judge in Mula. 
Thus, judges may have responded to the demands of the water owners (Waterlords), but not necessarily 
to those of the farmers. In practice, however, the Waterlords who owned most of the water rights but did 
not themselves farm were never members of the tribunal. The members of the tribunal were instead 
farmers wealthy enough to own water rights. Any individual, regardless of water ownership, could sue or 
be sued at court. 
The water had to be bought in cash at the auction. Farmers in Mula did not have access to credit 
markets (see Donna and Espín-Sanchez, 2018b, for a thorough discussion about liquidity constraints in 
this setting). Failure to pay for the water meant the prohibition of buying water in the future, until the 
debt was paid. This strict rule did not apply to the fines or compensations after a trial. A defendant found 
guilty may take several weeks to pay the fine or the compensation, but would be allowed to buy water at 
the auction in the meantime. This suggests that the farmers and the tribunal saw water theft as a form of 
credit. On one hand, the probability of being caught after committing a crime was very high, according to 
the narratives in the trials. On the other, upon being caught, the farmer would have to pay the value of the 
water stolen plus a fine. These two circumstances, seemingly contradicting when there was an auction the 
weeks before the crime, are rationalized by the use of the option to steal water during a drought as an 
insurance of last resort by liquidity constrained farmers. This is consistent with the findings in Donna and 
Espín-Sánchez (2018b). 
Seven elected water owners sat on the Mula tribunal. They were elected among the water-owners 
every year, on December 26th, and their appointment lasted for two years. In odd years, four members 
were elected; in even years three members were elected. Thus, in any given year there were three (four) 
members of the council in their first term and four (three) members in their second term. The voting was 
by secret ballot, writing the name of the candidate in a piece of paper. Every year, the tribunal members 
elected a president who appointed a vice-president and treasurer from the tribunal and a secretary, chosen 
from the general public. The tribunal resolved water disputes between farmers. Farmers could not appeal 
the tribunal's rulings to other courts. In the article, we call all the offenses “crimes.” These crimes, and the 
bylaws that regulated them, were recognized by customary law during the ancien régime. Later, they 
were added to the Spanish Civil Code in the 19th century. 
As mentioned by Garrido (2011a), there is heterogeneity in Spanish irrigation communities' 
monitoring and enforcement of crimes. In some communities, paid guards monitored water use, while in 
others farmers took turns monitoring the canals. In many places, the watchman who caught a criminal 
kept a fraction of the fine, typically a half or a third. This incentive applied to both farmers and paid 
guards. In Mula, farmers monitored water use before the bylaws of 1933, and professional guards after. 
We do not observe a change in farmers' behavior after 1933. 
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2.2. Trial Data 
Figure 1 shows a trial, with the farmers as judges, and a map of the area under study. During the mid-
19th century, following the French, local irrigation communities in Mediterranean Spain began to track 
information about their trials. The archive in Mula contains all trials spanning 1851 to 1948. Figure 2 
displays a sample sentence, corresponding to a single trial, on August 12, 1906. Trial data consists of 282 
trials over 97 years (approximately three trials per year). The defendant was found guilty in 174 trials, 
yielding approximately two guilty sentences per year. Admittedly, this is a relatively small number of 
trials. Note, however, that the data include all the trials in the archive over almost a century (97 years). 
The fact that there are few trials per year-relative to the total number of farmers who could potentially 
steal water during a given day-emphasizes our argument that the system deterred crime.17 Following 
Ostrom (1990), there were approximately 500 farmers at any given period of time in our case, with 40 
auctions held every week, so the roughly 500 farmers would have had 26,000 (52 weeks per year 500 
farmers) opportunities for theft, as contrasted with the two crimes per year, which means an infraction 
rate of 0.00008 (2/25,000 = 0.0000769), approximately 100 times (0.008/0.00008) lower than that in 
Castellon considered extremely low by Ostrom (1990).18 Mula is located in Southeastern Spain, one of the 
driest regions in Europe. Conflicts among farmers are common in this region, and their motivation is 
water, rather than land, rights, as the second quote from Elinor Ostrom in the introduction emphasizes. 
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the variables in the dataset.19 Note that no auction was carried out 
in 101 out of the 282 weeks when a crime was reported. This is because there was not enough water in the 
dam during those weeks. The default fine for any violation was 25 pesetas.20 Judges could impose any 
fine between 0 and 25 pesetas. This upper bound did not change during our sample period.21  
Trial information includes the offender's name, whether he/she was a Don, the plaintiff's name (a 
farmer or a guard) and whether he/she was a Don, the name of the judge (president of the council) and the 
verdict, the amount of the fine if any, the amount of the compensation (if any), and the date (of the trial 
and reported crime). When the water was stolen from a sub-canal directed to a farmer's plot, that farmer 
was the plaintiff and the victim, i.e., the farmer would receive the monetary compensation. When the 
water was stolen from the main canal, the guard was the plaintiff and the victim was the association, i.e., 
the association would receive the monetary compensation. 
																																																																		
17In the other 108 cases, nobody was brought before the judge. The typical case involved a farmer complaining that he/she did not receive enough 
water when irrigating. The guards would testify that, after inspecting the area, they found no flooded plot. In other words, a complaint was filed 
but no charges were brought. In those cases, the defendant would be the guard on duty on that day, the manager responsible, or the whole 
Heredamiento. We recorded whether the guard or manager had a Don honorific title. 
18 Ostrom (1990, p. 75) emphasizes: “There were approximately 1,000 [irrigators] in Castellon in the fifteenth century (T.F. Glick, personal 
communication). If the rotation system took about two weeks, each of the roughly 1,000 irrigators would have had about 25,000 opportunities for 
theft occurred, as contrasted to 200 recorded instances of illegal taking of water. That would give a recorded infraction rate of 0.008.” 
19 We use nominal pesetas for all the results. Results using real pesetas with the deflator in Reher and Ballesteros (1993) are very similar, and are 
available upon request.  
20 The peseta was introduced in 1868. Before that, the payments were made in reales. 1 peseta is equivalent to 4 reales. For simplicity, we 
transformed all the amounts to pesetas. 
21 In two instances, the judges imposed a fine greater than 25 pesetas. In the first one, a miller was found guilty of stealing water twice the same 
week. The miller was fined with 50 pesetas. In the other, five men, all Don, were found guilty of a plot to block the main canal, and of cheating in 
the auction. One of them bid for several units in a row, then the others used this water for irrigation, which was forbidden. In this case, the 
average fine per farmer was 65 pesetas. 
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Figure 3.A shows that the crimes with Don victims are more frequent during the summer months. 
This observation is consistent with farmers' strategic behaviors during the summer growing season. 
Farmers expected a lower punishment, and higher efficiency gains, if they stole from a wealthy farmer.  
2.3. Water Auctions Data 
Although the process of allocating water in Mula varied slightly over the years, the basic structure 
remained essentially unchanged from the 15th to the 20th century. Land in Mula was divided into regadío 
(irrigated land) and secano (dry land). Irrigation was only permitted on the former type. A canal system 
allowed water from the river to reach all regadío lands.22 The fundamental reason for this division is that 
regadío were fertile lands that are close to rivers and, hence, allow a more efficient use of the region's 
scarce water. Only farmers who owned a piece of regadío land in Mula were allowed to buy water. For 
more details about the allocation mechanism see Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018a). 
Farmers bought water in a sequential English-auction. The auctioneer sold each of the units 
sequentially and independently of each other. They kept track of the name of the buyer of every unit and 
the price paid by the winner. The farmers could not store water in their plots or resell water. There was 
no auction in 101 of the weeks during which there was a trial. The dummy variable for whether there was 
an auction has an average of 0.64, and we have only 181 weeks of water prices. 
Farmers paid cash for their purchases. Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018b) show that liquidity 
constraints prevented farmers from buying water, even when their valuations were above the equilibrium 
price. A system of flexible fines partially mitigated imperfect insurance and credit markets, providing 
farmers with insurance of last resort. When a poor farmer's crops were at risk, they could steal water for 
irrigation and save their crop with a minimal punishment. Thus, the results here complement and 
reinforce the ones in Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018b). 
Figure 3.B shows the number of trials preceded by an auction in the week before. The number of 
trials where there was an auction the week before increases during the dry months in the summer. Note 
that this figure shows the trials where there was an auction the previous week. Thus, it is not a random 
sample. Typically, the probability of having auctions throughout the year is high, but it decreases 
substantially during the summer. Conditional on a crime, the probabilities are different. The high 
percentage of crimes when auctions were not held during the winter might seem puzzling (e.g. 
December). Generally, in those wet months the number of crimes was low. However, if farmers could not 
buy water at auction, they might resort to stealing. 
2.4. Rain 
We complement the trial and auction data with daily rainfall data for Murcia, which we obtain from 
the Agencia Estatal de Metereología (AEMET), the National Meteorological Agency in Spain. Rainfall 
data from Mula is only available after 1933, while the rain data for Murcia goes back to 1865. The two 
																																																																		
22 The canal system was expanded from the 13th to 15th century, as a response to the greater demand for land due to the increase in population. 
The regadío land's structure has not change since the 15th century. 
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cities are only 35 kilometers apart, and they are located in the same valley.23 Mediterranean climate 
rainfall occurs mainly during spring and fall. Peak water requirements for the products cultivated in the 
region are reached in spring and summer, between May and August. In addition to the auction dummy 
variable, and the price of water, we also use two additional variables that are correlated with farmers' 
need for water. The variable season is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the crime was committed during 
the months of May, June, July or August, and zero otherwise. The variable dry week is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if there was no rain the week before the trial, and zero otherwise. 
 
3. MODEL AND PREDICTIONS 
In this section, we present the model, and describe its predictions and their fit to the data. We propose 
a model in which farmers are heterogeneous in two dimensions: water need and water greed.24 Both types 
are private information. The judge may observe public signals that are correlated with each of them, and 
may adjust punishment accordingly. We assume that the two types are independent, but the predictions 
are similar if we allow for correlation. Farmers' utility function is concave in water consumed. Farmers' 
greed type is only relevant when they steal water. Greedy farmers suffer less from the punishment. In the 
cases were a complaint was filed but no one was accused, the complaint stated only that the water flowing 
through the canal was “lower than expected,” but after a guard was called in and the canals inspected, 
there was no water missing. 
The farmers are rational and forward looking. They steal water whenever it is profitable, conditional 
on expected punishment. The judge is benevolent, rational, and forward looking. The optimal punishment 
depends on the information available to the judge, including public signals, farmers' individual 
characteristics, and farmers' criminal histories. We interpret each trial as a game between the farmer and 
the judge. The rain in the town the week before the crime occurred is a public signal observed by the 
judge. It is correlated with the idiosyncratic need of water of the farmer. Past behavior and certain 
characteristics of the farmers, such as whether they are a Don, are signals that are correlated with farmer’s 
greed. 
The judge always imposes the optimal punishment. It corresponds to the first best when it is feasible, 
and the second best when the first best is not feasible. A first best, or efficient, punishment system means 
that farmers steal water if, and only if, it is socially optimal. There are neither false positives nor false 
negatives. In this case, the optimal punishment does not depend on the public signal. The first best 
allocation might not be feasible, as we discuss below. Intuitively this is because the judge can implement 
the first best only when the farmers are relatively homogeneous in their greed, and relatively 
heterogeneous in their need. 
  
																																																																		
23 The correlation of rain in the two cities is 0.82. The monthly average (standard deviation) rain is 257.7mm and 261.2mm (322.3 and 362.1) for 
Murcia and Mula, respectively. 
24 Alternatively, the first dimension measures whether the farmer is needy, while the second measures whether the farmer is greedy. 
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3.1. Static Model 
To simplify the exposition we assume that the probability of a farmer being caught is equal to one. 
This is consistent with the empirical record where only three times in one hundred years was a case 
reported, and no-one was accused.25 Farmer i has the following expected utility function: 
Ui (ri + w, θi, F (R)), 
where ri ∈{rL, rH} is the individual state of the farmer, i.e., the amount of rain he/she received in his/her 
plot and uses for irrigation, which can be high or low (rH > rL); w ∈ {0, W}, with W > 0, is the amount of 
water stolen by the farmer; θi ∈{θH, θL} is the type of the farmer (either not greedy, θi = θH, or greedy, θi = 
θL); R ∈ {H, L} is a public signal about the individual state, i.e., the amount of rain in the town, which can 
be high or low (H > L); F(R) ∈ {0, F} is the fine imposed to the farmer if caught stealing water, which is a 
continuous variable capped at F as prescribed in the bylaws of the Heredamiento and can depend on the 
public signal. The farmers’ type θi only affects the farmer's utility when he/she steals and is convicted.26 
That is, the utility of two farmers that receive the same amount of rain and do not steal water is the same, 
regardless of their type. 
A farmer can steal from the main canal when no other farmer is irrigating in which case the whole 
community suffers. The most common case, however, happen when a farmer deviates the water from the 
main canal or a sub-canal when another farmer is irrigating, and effectively steals water from this farmer. 
Only farmer i observes ri. Rainfall, R, is a public signal; however, the way the farmer uses the water is 
not. The water used by the farmer would be highly correlated with the amount of rain in the town, but 
not perfectly. Some farmers, for example, have irregular land and they cannot take advantage of all the 
water they get. Alternatively, the farmer may not be able to go to the plot and plow the water the day of 
the rainfall due to a contingency, such as sickness. More generally, ri captures idiosyncratic component 
for farmer i of rainfall used for irrigation; ri is the usage of the observed rainfall, R. Both the judge and 
the farmer observe the public signal, R, which is correlated with the individual state, ri, as follows: 
Prob(ri = rL|R = RL) = qL, 
Prob(ri = rL|R = RH ) = qH. 
Note that, even when the judge observes the public signal, in equilibrium there would be false 
negatives and positives, i.e., guilty farmers will be set free and innocent farmers will be punished. Our 
model nests the following special cases: 
• qH = qL = 1/2: in this case the signal is uninformative. This is the case where one does not take into 
account the possibility of public signals about the criminal type. 
• qH = 1 - qL = 0: in this case the signal reveals the type perfectly. This is an implicit assumption in 
Beckerian models, in which the trial will determine whether the defendant is guilty or not, without 
error. 
																																																																		
25These cases are false claims according to the guards. A model with a probability of being caught less than one has similar predictions, but would 
make the algebra more cumbersome. Results are available upon request.  
26We do not distinguish between the case where farmers suffer if they steal but are not caught (self-ashamed), from the one where they suffer 
only if they are caught and convicted (social-ashamed). Cases where farmers stole water and they are not caught are not observed in the data and 
it is not possible to distinguish self-ashamed from social ashamed cases. 
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Let π ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that a farmer is not greedy, i.e., Prob(θi = θH) = π, which is common 
knowledge. Without loss of generality, let us normalize the most informative signal, RL; thus, qL ≥ qH. 
This is equivalent to say that it is more likely that the farmer receives low water when the rain in the town 
is low than when the water in the town is high. 
If a farmer does not steal water, her/his utility is: 
u(ri,. , 0). 
If a farmer steals an amount of water equal to w, her/his utility is: 
u(ri + W, θi, F(R)), 
where u(. ,. ,.) is the Bernoulli utility function. Note that, when a farmer does not steal water, her/his 
utility only depends on her/his private amount of water, ri. When a farmer steals water, however, in 
addition to her/his private amount of water ri, her/his utility also depends on her/his (greed) type, θi, and 
on the public signal, R, through the punishment received. We interpret θi in terms of the marginal returns 
derived from an additional unit of water stolen. In that sense, a higher θi is related to a better technology 
when stealing water. It could capture, for example, that the farmer has several workers (sons) who help 
her/him irrigate within a short period of time, or an idiosyncratic advantage due to the shape of the 
farmer's plot.27 
We assume u(. ,. ,.) is strictly increasing and concave in its first term, strictly decreasing in its third 
term, and has a negative cross-derivative between the second and third term.28 
Example: 
Let u(ri + W, θi, F(R)) = (ri + W)α - θiF(R), with α ∈ (0, 1). It is straightforward to verify 
that the assumptions hold. 
The Farmer's problem 
To make the problem relevant for the empirical application, we restrict attention to the parameters 
that would create incentives to steal water, and where it would be efficient for them to do so. In 
particular, we make the following assumption about the parameter space: 29 
Assumption A1: It is efficient that the farmer steals water if he/she received low rain: 
u(rL + W, θi, F(R)) - u(rL, θi, .) ≥ PR(W),  for all F(R), θi 
where PR(W) is the social value of W units of water when the public signal is R, i.e., PR = qR(u(rL + W) - 
u(rL))+ (1 - qR)(u(rH + W) - u(rH + W)). 
The public signal can be reinterpreted as the proportion (rather than the probability) of farmers who 
received low rain. Hence, the social value PR(W) equals the average utility that the amount of water, W, 
adds. The left-hand side in the previous equation represents the increase in utility that farmer i received 
																																																																		
27 In one of the trials, the method to steal the water was particularly innovative. The defendant told three children to “swim” in the canal that 
was next to his plot in such way that the canal was blocked. The water then overflowed the canal and spilled over the defendant's plot. 
28 Formally the assumptions are: (a) u1(.,.,.) > 0: The farmer receives a positive utility from water, stolen or not; (b) u11(.,.,.) < 0: Water has 
diminishing marginal returns; (c) u2(.,.,.) ≤ 0: Greedy farmers suffer less from stealing than not greedy ones; (d) u2(.,.,0) = 0: If a farmer does 
not steal water, her/his utility is not affected by her/his (greedy) type; (e) u3(.,.,.) < 0: The farmer receives a negative utility from the 
punishment; (f) u23(.,.,.) < 0: Greedy farmers suffer less from a given punishment than greedy ones. 
29 See Di Tella and Dubra (2008) for a similar approach. In their model the choice of becoming a criminal depends on a “meanness” shock, which 
is used to establish the severity of punishment. 
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when he/she steals W units of water. The right-hand side of the equation represents the expected increase 
in utility that a random farmer would have received had he/she used the water that was stolen. 
Example: 
Let u(ri + W, θi, F(R)) = (ri + W)α - θiF(R), with α ∈ (0, 1), rL = 0, and W ≈ 0. Then, 
u(rL,θi, .) = 0 and u11(.,.,.) < 0, and both assumptions are satisfied. Moreover, this decision 
is socially efficient. 
The timing of the game is as follows. First, nature draws {ri, R}; the farmer observes {ri, R}. Second, 
the farmer chooses whether to steal, i.e., w ∈ {0, W}. Third, if the farmer stole water, the judge observes R 
and chooses a policy function F(R). Fourth, payoffs are given. If the farmer does not steal, he/she cannot 
be caught; her/his utility is u(ri, ., 0). If the farmer chooses to steal, i.e., w = W, he/she is caught and 
her/his utility is u(ri + W, θi, F(R)). 
Thus, the farmer steals if, and only if: 
u(ri + W, θi, F(R)) ≥ u(ri, ., 0).  
If the judge were to observe θi, the judge could choose F(R) so that the farmer finds it profitable to 
steal water if ri = rL, and does not steal water if ri = rH. This is the first best outcome, and is a 
consequence of the concavity of the utility function with respect to water. However, the judge does not 
know θi. Thus, in general, the first best outcome is not attainable. 
Prediction P0: A farmer is more likely to steal water when her/his need for water is high. 
The lower the water level in the farmer's plot, the higher the farmer's marginal utility of additional water 
and, thus, the more likely that he/she will steal water. The judge can impose a punishment that achieves 
the first best when the differences in utility due to the water need are larger than the differences in utility 
due to water greed. If the first best is not feasible, then the judge decides between two second best 
punishment systems for each realization of the public signal. The two possible optimal punishments are: 
• Harsh punishment: the only farmers who steal water are greedy farmers who need water. This 
system is not efficient because not greedy farmers, who need water, do not steal water. In other 
words, there is “too little stealing,” due to false positives. 
• Mild punishment: all farmers, except the not greedy farmers who do not need water, steal. This 
system is not efficient because greedy farmers, who do not need water, steal. In other words, there 
is “too much stealing,” due to false negatives. 
For a given amount of rain, there could not be simultaneously false positives and false negatives. In 
practice, however, it is likely for the judge to impose a harsh punishment in a particular week when the 
signal (rain) is high, and a mild punishment in different week when the signal (rain) is low. That is, the 
punishment would be larger when it rained the week before the water was stolen. In general, the judge is 
more likely to impose a harsh punishment when: (i) the public signal is highly correlated with the water 
needs of the farmers; and (ii) many farmers are greedy. 
The intuition behind the second best punishment system is the following. Farmers in need (i.e. 
farmers who are desperate) are more likely to steal water, which is efficient. However, greedy farmers are 
also more likely to steal water, which need not be efficient. An intermediate punishment can always 
15	
	
induce needy, greedy farmers to steal water and not needy, not greedy farmers not to steal it. Both 
scenarios are efficient. Whether the punishment can achieve the first best depends on whether needy, not 
greedy farmers are more likely to steal water than not needy, greedy farmers. Intuitively, when greed does 
not matter, and has little impact on the decision to steal, needy farmers (greedy or not) are more likely to 
steal than not needy farmers (greedy or not). In that case, there is always an intermediate punishment that 
“separates” needy from not needy farmers. However, when greed does have a large impact on the decision 
to steal, not needy, greedy farmers would be more likely to steal than needy, not greedy farmers under any 
punishment system. In that case, there is no punishment system that would “separate” these farmers (not 
needy, greedy from needy, not greedy). The optimal punishment in this case would be second best, and it 
consists of either punishing all the farmers in this pool (harsh), or none of them (mild). 
In the next section, we relate these predictions to the empirical regularities in our setting. Predictions 
P1, P2, and P3 relate to the information available for the judge. They show that we need two dimensions 
of private characteristics to explain the empirical regularity that punishments are rarely maximal and 
depend on the information available to the judge. Taken together with the empirical analysis below, these 
predictions suggest that we are in a second-best environment. Predictions P4, P5, and P6 provide specific 
predictions regarding the characteristics of the crime, the victim, and the criminal's history, respectively. 
The Judge's Problem 
The judge's objective is to achieve social efficiency. The judge wants to punish the farmer if he/she 
steals water when ri = rH, and not to punish her/him when ri = rL. But the judge does not observe the 
individual state of the farmer, ri. Instead, the judge only observes a signal, R, which is positively, but not 
perfectly, correlated with the rainfall in the farmer's plot, ri.30 Although we are interested in the more 
realistic case where greed is not fully observable and the public signal is imperfectly correlated with the 
individual state of water available to farmer i, we show as benchmarks the cases where either the greed 
type θi or the water need type ri is observable. The benchmarks highlight why we need a model with two 
dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity to obtain testable predictions in our setting. 
We allow the judge to observe a noisy signal about the water needs, but not about the greed of the 
farmer. This is for the following three reasons. First, we do not have data regarding the greed of the 
farmers, thus we cannot test the predictions of such an extension. Second, although the judge does not 
observe a direct signal related to the greed of the farmer, he/she observes an indirect signal in the 
dynamic game. Greed is a permanent state, while water needs are not. Therefore, a recidivist is more 
likely to be greedy than a first-time offender. Recidivism can then be interpreted as an indirect greed 
signal. We explore this in the next subsection, when we introduce dynamics. Finally, the model would be 
more complicated to solve, but the intuition regarding the signal about would be similar. 
Greed is perfectly observable. In this case the judge does not observe the water available to the farmer, 
ri, but the judge observes the greed type of the farmer. Thus, the farmer can condition the punishment both 
																																																																		
30If we consider the case with asymmetric farmers, with characteristics observed by the judge, the public signal is still a sufficient statistic for all 
relevant information observable by the judge. 
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in the greedy type the farmer, ri, and the public signal, R. The judge chooses the punishment so that only 
a farmer in need of water, i.e., ri = rL, would find it profitable to steal. The optimal punishment satisfies: 
u(rL + W, θi, F(R, θi)) ≥ u(rL, ., 0), 
u(rH + W, θi, F(R, θi)) < u(rH, ., 0). 
Now assume that the judge would like to choose the minimum punishment, F(R, θi), that satisfies this 
condition, for example, because farmers are poor. Then F(R, θi) solves u(rL + W, θi, F(R, θi)) = u(rL, θi, 
0). Since u(., ., .) is concave in its first argument, a sufficient condition for such a punishment to exist is 
that u(., ., .) is linear in its third argument, i.e., that utility is quasi-linear on the fine. 
Example: 
Let u(ri + W, θi, F(R, θi)) = (ri + W)α - θiF(R) 
Then, the optimal punishment is: 
F(R, θi) = min {F, (1/θi)((rL + W)/rL)α}. 
The punishment does not depend on the public signal because the judge can separate between greed 
types, by imposing different punishments. The optimal punishment is increasing in the amount of water 
stolen, W; decreasing in θi, and decreasing in the amount of rain received by the farmer in the bad state, rL. 
The last result says that punishment is lower when the farmer needs less water, i.e., when the gains from 
stealing water are smaller. This is because, as long as rL is sufficiently lower relative to rH, it is optimal 
that the farmer steals water. But the gains of stealing water are smaller when rL are greater. Thus, the 
judge imposes a smaller punishment. Note that if greed is irrelevant, i.e., θL = θH, then the same results 
apply. In that case, the optimal punishment would always be the same. In the example above the optimal 
punishment would be F(R, θi) = (1/θi)((rL + W)/rL)α.  
Prediction P1: If greed is perfectly observable, then the optimal punishment is independent 
of the public signal and positive. 
In the data, we observe that the punishment varies as a function of the previous week's rainfall, which 
means that the judge cannot perfectly observe greed, but that he/she is concerned about it. 
Need type is perfectly observable. In this case, the judge knows the rain in the farmer's plot, but not 
whether the farmer is greedy. Thus, the judge can condition the fine on the individual state, that is, F(R) = 
F(ri). This is equivalent to having a perfectly correlated public signal: qL = qH = 1. The judge allows 
farmers to steal when ri = rL, but not when ri = rH. The first result holds if u(rL + W, θi, F(rL)) ≥ u(rL, θi, 
0), for all θi. To obtain the latter, the judge imposes a fine sufficiently high, F(rH) = F. In general, 
efficiency is not guaranteed. Following the intuition before, the judge can impose the minimum 
punishment possible when the state is low, i.e., F(rL) = 0, and the maximum punishment available with 
the state is high, i.e., F(rH) = F. However, if F is sufficiently small, then a farmer with ri = rH would find 
it optimal to steal water in the high state, and in that case, the farmer will always steal water, regardless of 
the punishment implemented by the judge. In our empirical setting the judges never impose the maximum 
punishment for the first offense. That means that the case where the maximum punishment is very low is 
not relevant empirically. 
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Example (continued): 
The inequality above implies (rL + W)α  - θiF(rL) ≥ (rL), for all θi. A greedy farmer has less 
disutility from stealing water, thus it is only necessary to check that the inequality holds for 
greedy farmers, i.e., (rL + W)α - θLF(rL) > (rL + W)α - θiF(rL) ≥ (rL)α. The optimal punishment 
satisfies F(RL) ≤ (1/θH)((rL + W)/rL)α. Any punishment that satisfies this condition would deter 
crime. In practice, and given that the judge knows that the farmer needs the water, it is likely 
that the chosen punishment would be the minimum available, i.e., F(rL) = 0. 
Note that the predictions are different from the previous case. If rain is high, punishment is maximum and 
nobody steals in equilibrium. If rain is low, punishment depends on the rain received in the bad state. 
Optimal punishment is increasing in the amount of water stolen, W; decreasing in the greed of the 
greediest farmer θH; and decreasing in the amount of rain received by the farmer in the bad state, rL. 
 
Prediction P2: If water needs are perfectly observable, then the optimal punishment is 
maximal when the signal is high and minimal when the signal is low, i.e., F(rH ) = F and 
F(rL) = 0. 
In the data, we observe that the punishment is usually low. If the punishment varies with the public 
signal, it does not reach a maximum even after a heavy rain. The data shows that the punishment varied 
with individual characteristics which, together with predictions P1 and P2, imply that the judge observed 
imperfect signals correlated with each dimension. We believe that both types are private information and 
that both shocks are idiosyncratic or, equivalently, the judge does not perfectly observe the shocks. 
Judges had good information about how greedy were each farmer, but the information is not perfect. 
Even if the rainfall is the same for the plots of all farmers, they have plots of different sizes. However, 
they buy units of water of the same size, which means that they have different levels of moisture in their 
plots in any given week. The judge does not perfectly observe the moisture level in a farmer's plot. 
To rationalize predictions P1 and P2 we need at least two dimensions of heterogeneity. The following 
predictions relate to the particular two-dimensional model that we propose. 
Greed and need types are unobservable. Now the judge only observes the public signal about the rain 
in the town, R, neither the farmer's type, θi, nor the farmer's individual rain, ri. Thus, the judge can only 
condition the fine on the public signal, F(R). Given R, the farmer is not greedy with probability π. 
Depending on the parameters, the judge may impose a fine such that all farmers steal for all realizations 
of R, no farmer steals for any realization of R, or, more interestingly, farmers steal when R = L, and they 
do not steal when R = H. We focus on the latter case. In the discussion that follows it is useful to simplify 
the notation as follows. Define the gains from stealing water for type (ri, θj) as Δ(ri, θj) ≡ u(ri + W, θj, 
F(R)) - u(ri, θj; 0). 
In general, an efficient punishment deters not needy types, rH, from stealing and encourages needy 
types, rL, to steal. Thus, an efficient punishment satisfies the following inequalities, depending on the four 
realizations of the two types: 
• Greedy and not needy:   Δ(rH, θL) < 0, i.e., u(rH + W, θL, F(R)) < u (rH, θL, 0). 
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• Greedy and needy:   Δ(rL, θL) ≥ 0, i.e., u(rL + W, θL, F(R)) ≥ u(rL, θL, 0). 
• Not greedy and needy:    Δ(rH, θH) < 0, i.e., u(rL + W, θH, F(R)) <  u(rL, θH, 0). 
• Not greedy and needy:    Δ(rL, θH) ≥ 0, i.e., u(rL + W, θH, F(R)) ≥ u(rL, θH, 0). 
Depending on whether the greed effect is important, the judge could apply an optimal punishment. If 
greed has a small effect on the utility of the farmers, the judge would be able to implement the efficient 
punishment. However, if greed affects the utility of the farmers more than their individual state, then the 
optimal punishment would not be efficient. We formalize this with the following assumption. 
Assumption A2: The parameters are such that the following relation holds for any punishment, F(R): 
Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rL, θL). 
Assumption A2 implies that a farmer who is needy but not greedy benefits more from stealing water 
than one who is greedy but not needy. In other words, the need of water effect is stronger than the greed 
effect for the decision to steal water. When assumption A2 holds, the differences in utility from stealing 
water are ranked as follows:  
Δ(rL, θL) > Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rH, θL) > Δ(rH, θH), 
where the first and the third inequality follow from the fact that greed types suffer more from the stealing, 
and the second inequality comes from A2. In this case, and using that the function is monotonically 
decreasing in F(R), it is straightforward to see that an optimal punishment exist that can “separate” the 
needy from the not needy farmers. Such punishment would be high enough to make needy farmers steal 
water, and not needy farmers not steal so that in equilibrium: 
Δ(rL, θL) > Δ(rL, θH) > 0 > Δ(rH, θL) > Δ(rH, θH).  (1) 
In this case, the optimal punishment does not depend on the public signal, and the first best can be 
achieved with a fixed punishment. When A2 does not hold however, the rank between the differences in 
utility from stealing water is as follows: 
Δ(rL, θL) > Δ(rH, θL) > Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rH, θH), 
Note that now no punishment can “separate” the needy from the not needy farmers. However, we can 
still characterize the second-best punishment, for each signal realization. Using again the monotonicity of 
punishment it is easy to see that there are two second best punishments that could be applied here. The 
first (mild) punishment allows stealing water to all types except (rH, θH). This can be achieved with a low 
punishment. The second (harsh) punishment allows stealing water only to farmers of type (rL, θL). In 
equilibrium, these second-best punishments imply: 
Mild Δ(rL, θL) > Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rH, θL) > 0 > Δ(rH, θH).  (2) 
Harsh Δ(rL, θL) > 0  > Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rH, θL) > Δ(rH, θH).  (3)  
One can see that when the public signal is not informative, i.e., qL ≈ qH, the optimal punishment 
would be either always Mild or always Harsh. However, when the public signal is informative, i.e., qL >> 
qH, the optimal punishment would typically imply a Mild punishment when the signal is low, i.e., R = L, 
and a Harsh punishment when the signal is high, i.e., R = H. The intuition is straightforward. In any 
optimal punishment system and under any signal, needy and greedy (rL, θL) types always steal water and 
not needy and not greedy (rH, θH) types never steal water, both of which are efficient. The inefficiency 
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arises because the judge cannot distinguish not needy and greedy (rH, θL) from needy and not greedy (rL, 
θH) types, with the punishment. The judge would like the former to steal water, but not the latter. 
However, these two types are pooled together. When the signal is low, a high fraction of the farmers in 
the pool are needy and not greedy (rL, θH) type; thus it is optimal for the judge to allow everyone in the 
pool to steal water. When the signal is high, a small fraction of the farmers in the pool are needy and not 
greedy (rL, θH) type. So, it is optimal for the judge to allow no one in the pool to steal water. 
“High” and “Low” fractions here are relative. The actual threshold depends on the preferences of the 
judge, and the number of farmers of each type, conditional on the signal. For example, the judge 
objective function could be uniformly utilitarian. In that case, he/she wants to allow the farmers in the 
pool if there are more than 50 percent of needy and not greedy types. Then, it could be that qL > qH > 0.5, 
and the judge wants to always implement the Mild punishment, for both signals. Alternatively, if 0.5 > qL 
> qH, then the judge always wants to implement the Harsh punishment. The more interesting and realistic 
case happens when qL > 0.5 > qH. In that case, the judge implements the Mild punishment when the 
signal is low, and the harsh punishment when the signal is high, i.e., F(L) < F(H). The optimal 
punishment would depend on the fraction of farmers who are not greedy, π. When π is small, most 
farmers in the pool would be greedy, and the judge would impose a harsher punishment. 
Example (continued): 
Using the middle inequalities in equation (1) we obtain:  
((rL - W)α - (rL)α)/θH ≥ F(R) ≥ ((rH - W)α - (rH)α)/θL. 
This condition holds when the difference between rL and rH is large; when the amount of 
water stolen, W, is high; or when the greed are types similar, θH ≈ θL. 
 Example (continued): 
If the judge imposes a high fine, F(R) > ((rH - W)α - (rH)α)/θL, both types will not steal when ri = 
rH. This is optimal. However, greedy farmers steal when ri = rL if ((rL - W)α - (rL)α)/θH ≥ F(R). 
The outcome is inefficient only when the farmer is needy but not greedy, θi = θH and ri = rL, 
which happens with probability qRπ when the public signal is R. The fine is F(R) = ((rL - W)α - 
(rL)α)/θL. If this condition does not hold, the fine is deterring all farmers from stealing at all 
times. This is not what we observe in the data, where fines are low and there is some crime. If 
the judge imposes a low fine, F(R) ≤ ((rL - W)α - (rL)α)/θH, both types steal when ri = rL. This is 
also optimal. The greedy types steal when ri = rH if F(R) ≤ ((rH - W)α - (rH)α)/θL. The outcome is 
inefficient only when the farmer is greedy and receives high rain, θi = θH and ri = rH, which 
happens with probability (1- qR)(1- π) when the public signal is R. The fine is now F(R) = ((rL - 
W)α - (rL)α)/θH. 
Prediction P3: If both greed and water need are unobservable, and we can separate not 
needy, greedy from needy, not greedy farmers, then the first best is feasible and the 
optimal punishment does not depend on the public signal. 
There are two implications from P3. First, it complements P1 in that even if greed is unobservable, 
first best punishment may still be independent of the public signal. In the data, we observe that 
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punishment varies as a function of rainfall during the previous week. This means that we are in the 
second-best scenario. Second, P3 formalizes the intuition above that punishment is efficient if, and only 
if, we can separate not needy, greedy from needy, not greedy farmers. This occurs when not needy, greedy 
farmers are more sensitive to punishment than needy, not greedy ones. 
Prediction P4: If both greed and water needs are unobservable, and the first best is 
unfeasible, then the optimal punishment requires a mild punishment when the signal is 
low and a harsh punishment when the signal is high. 
The analysis for the judge's behavior above is related to the characteristics of the crime and of the 
criminal. However, the efficiency of the system also depends on the characteristics of the victim. 
Assumption A1 means that it is efficient for a farmer that received low rain, rL, to steal water from an 
“average” farmer. A direct consequence is that it is also efficient for a farmer to steal water from a farmer 
that received high rain, rH. Due to the concavity of the utility function on water, the marginal utility of 
water is highest for a farmer that received rL, is lowest for a farmer that received rH, and it is intermediate 
for the average farmer. Thus, A1 implies that it is also efficient to steal water from farmer that received 
high rain, i.e., u(rL + W, θi, F(R)) - u(rL, θi,.) ≥ PRH(W) ≡ u(rH + W) - u(rH). Moreover, following the 
same logic, the gain in efficiency when a farmer that received low rain rL steals water would be greater 
when the victim is a farmer that received high rain. Finally, the lower the probability qR that the victim 
received low rain rL, the higher the efficiency gains from stealing, and the less likely is that judge would 
impose a harsh punishment. The intuition is the same as above. Before, when deciding between a harsh 
and a mild punishment the judge takes into account the probability that the defendant received low or 
high rain, i.e., the higher the probability that the defendant received low rain, the lower the punishment. 
Now, when deciding between a harsh and a mild punishment, the judge takes into account the probability 
that the victim received low or high rain, i.e., the higher the probability that the victim received high rain, 
the lower the punishment.  
Prediction P4 indicates the sign of the effect of the public signal on the punishment. The predictions 
of the static model refer to water need. These predictions also hold for any specific trial's observable 
characteristics, including the victim's individual characteristics, which convey the victim's water need. In 
our model, it is efficient for a farmer whose land received little rain, to steal water from a farmer whose 
land received heavy rain. This observation is summarized in prediction P5 below. 
Prediction P5: If both greed and water need are unobservable, and the first best is 
unfeasible, then the optimal punishment requires a mild punishment when the victim 
received heavy rain and a harsh punishment when the victim received light rain. 
In the next subsection, we discuss additional dynamic predictions. In our model, water needs are 
independent across periods, while greed is persistent across periods. This means that while all the 
predictions in the static case address the relative likelihood of water greed vs. water need, dynamic 
predictions address directly the likelihood that the farmer is greedy. That is, a recidivist is more likely to 
be greedy. 
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In the data, there is heterogeneity on the punishment for first time offenders, which is a direct 
consequence of the judge having some partial knowledge of individual characteristics. A farmer, who 
confessed the crime would get a very low fine of less than five pesetas, usually followed by an 
admonition of the judge that he/she understood that the farmer was in dire necessity, but that the 
punishment will be harsher if he/she did it again: 
“After the board learned about the excuses claimed by the defendants, they agreed to impose 
a fine of two pesetas, to each of them, because it was the first time that they incurred in 
such a misdemeanor, warning them that if they recidivate in the future, the fine would be 
larger.” Obtained from authors' translation of the trial on August 12, 1906, displayed in 
Figure 2 (bolds are ours).31 
This motivates the main prediction of the dynamic model: that recidivists are more likely to be 
greedy than first time offenders. 
3.2. Dynamic Predictions 
The main prediction of the dynamic model is that recidivists are more likely to be greedy than first 
time offenders. This is because the greed type is permanent, while the need type is not. In our model, we 
assume that the needy type is independent across periods. The main insight is that differences in water 
needs are “washed away” after a heavy rain, while differences in greed are not. In general, it is not 
possible to narrow the predictions without knowing the punishment system. The following prediction 
holds, however, under any optimal punishment system. 
Prediction P6: A recidivist farmer is more likely to be greedy than a first-time offender. 
Thus, the farmer is more likely to receive a harsh punishment. 
Predictions P4 and P6 imply that the judge takes observable characteristics into account when 
deciding the punishment. This is because these characteristics are correlated with the probability that a 
farmer is greedy. Thus, farmers who are more likely to be greedy are punished more harshly. Because 
first time offenders are not likely to be greedy, they would not receive a harsh punishment. In the trials, 
judges knew who recidivists were. Thus, they imposed them the maximum punishment, and mentioned 
this in the sentences (see, e.g., Figure 2). In our data, there is only one occasion where a farmer stole a 
third time. This is consistent with our model where stealing a third time is unlikely. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we perform the empirical analysis. The results are consistent with the predictions from 
our model, in which judges maximize efficiency under limited information. Judges use the available 
information regarding the crime, the victim, the criminal, and the criminal's history to impose the 
appropriate punishment. For details about the predictions of the model see the appendix.  
  
																																																																		
31 Note that the judge emphasizes, as shown in Figure 2, at the moment of the first-time offense, that recidivists will be punished more harshly. 
Such statements were common in judges’ sentences. We interpret them as validating the punishment progressivity of the system, even in cases 
where the counterfactual recidivism did not materialize (i.e. unobserved in the data). 
 
22	
	
Crime Rates 
Our model produces specific predictions about how observable characteristics are correlated with 
committing a crime. Table 2 presents marginal effects from probit regressions of the farmer being 
“guilty” on several covariates. The dependent variable, guilty, is a dummy variable identifying whether 
the farmer was found guilty. The covariates include a seasonal dummy, an indicator for the honorific title 
of the victim and defendant, and a dummy variable indicating whether there was an auction during the 
previous week. Wealthy (poor) farmers (do not) have a Don honorific title. Table 2 column 1 shows that 
on average, poor farmers are not more likely to be found guilty than wealthy farmers. This finding is 
consistent with the results in Vickers and Ziebarth (2016), which analyze Victorian London crime data, 
and also found that higher status individuals received a harsher punishment for the same offense. 
Column 2 shows that poor farmers are less likely to be found guilty during wet months, and more 
likely to be found guilty during dry months. These findings are consistent with poor farmers being needy 
(they steal water during the dry season), and wealthy farmers being greedy (they steal water during the 
wet season). Columns 3 and 4 show that the pattern does not change when we interact the variables with 
the characteristics of the victim. Columns 5-8 show that the results are robust to including the auction and 
dry month dummy variables. The auction dummy variable is positive, but not statistically significant. It 
suggests that farmers are more likely to be found guilty if they had the chance to buy water at the auction, 
although the coefficient is not precisely estimated. The dry month dummy variable shows that water 
scarcity significantly increases the likelihood of being guilty, consistent with prediction P0.32 Farmers are 
more likely to be in need of, and to steal, water during a dry month. 
Fines 
We now discuss the empirical results regarding punishment, and how they relate to the predictions 
from our model. The predictions are reflected in the fines imposed by the judge, as a function of the type 
of the crime and characteristics of the criminal. Table 3 presents the results from OLS regressions of 
fines on several covariates. 
Fines are significantly lower when the defendant is not a Don (i.e., poor farmer).  The 5.35 pesetas in 
column 1 shows that poor farmers receive a lower punishment for the same crime. Wealthy farmers are 
less likely to be in need of water. They usually have higher levels of moisture in their plots, because they 
irrigate more often (Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2018b). Thus, their marginal utility of water is lower, the 
damage of their crime is larger, and the damage (or marginal disutility) of stealing from them is lower. 
The judges respond by inflicting lower (higher) fines when the defendant is not (is) a Don, consistent with 
prediction P4. Our analysis implicitly assumes that social punishments are the same for everyone. 
However, it could be that wealthy farmers suffer higher social punishments than do poor farmers. If that 
were the case, we would underestimate the true value of the coefficient on column 1, i.e., the true effect 
would be even larger. 
																																																																		
32 Water prices are highly correlated with rain. Due to this collinearity, when both coefficients are included, neither is statistically significant. The 
null hypothesis that both are zero is rejected. 
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As regards individual farmer's characteristics, fines are significantly lower when the victim is 
wealthy, 4.53 pesetas lower in column 2. The judges respond by inflicting lower fines in cases where the 
damage is lower (column 3), consistent with prediction P5. Consistent with prediction P6, recidivists are 
punished more harshly. Their fines are over 15 pesetas higher than for first time offenders convicted of 
the same crime. That is, recidivists are punished with fines more than three times higher than the average. 
All recidivists receive fines of 20-25 pesetas, the maximum allowed in the bylaws. The weekly wage of a 
laborer was approximately 25 pesetas during the period under analysis. 
Columns 5-8 show that the results in columns 1-4 are robust to including the auction and the dry 
month dummy variables. Fines for crimes reported in weeks during which no auctions were run are 
significantly lower, 4.61 pesetas in column 5.33 A farmer, who stole water in a week when there was an 
auction, could have bought the water at the auction, unless he/she was liquidity constrained. This means 
that the farmer who stole water in a week with an auction was more likely to be liquidity constrained. 
Judges were more lenient in those cases. 
There is no correlation between seasonality and fines. There are two effects at play. During a drought, 
the need for water is higher and, thus, the judge imposes a lower fine. However, imposing a lower fine 
would also make farmers who do not need water more likely to steal. The former (direct) effect makes 
fines lower, while the later (indirect) effect makes fine larger. The results in Table 3 suggest that the 
indirect effect partially offsets the direct effect. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that the fines are lower when the victim is wealthy. Table 4 indicates 
that the amount of water stolen, and thus the compensation, is higher when the victim is wealthy. These 
results are consistent with our model. They may also be consistent with the following hypothesis. The 
judge is concerned about the total amount of the monetary punishment, fine plus compensation. In that 
case, the lower fines when the victim is wealthy may be a spurious correlation due to higher 
compensation paid when the victim is wealthy, and the negative correlation between compensations and 
fines. This hypothesis predicts a negative correlation between fine and compensation. It also predicts that 
adding compensation as a regressor in Table 3 would have a negative coefficient that is statistically 
different from zero. However, the correlation between fine and compensation is zero. Including 
compensation as a regressor in Table 3 produces a coefficient that is not statistically different from zero, 
and does not change the magnitude, sign, or statistical significance of the other coefficients. 
Compensation 
Fines have a punitive goal, to deter farmers from stealing. The revenue generated by the fines goes to 
the community. The goal of the compensation is to repair the damage inflicted to the victim of the crime: 
a particular farmer, if water was stolen from him/her; the community, if water was stolen from the main 
canal. Thus, the amount of the compensation is an estimate of the value of the water stolen. The 
sentences in the trials state clearly that the amount for each of these concepts. The judge separately 
																																																																		
33 In unreported results, we also find that punishments are significantly lower for water stolen from the main canal relative to water stolen from 
other farmers. This means that the judges consider a crime to be more severe when stealing from other farmer-who is not a Don-than stealing 
from the main canal. This is consistent with judges minimizing conflict among farmers. 
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mentions the fine and the compensation. In a typical case where a farmer steals water from another 
farmer, the money from the fine goes to the Heredamiento, whereas the money from the compensation 
goes to the victim. The amount of the compensation is always equal to the value of the water stolen, and 
the judge has no discretion over it. Therefore, one should interpret the results in Table 4 as characteristics 
of the crime. 
The effect of offenders' individual characteristics on the amount of compensation is consistent with 
the model and the results in Table 3. The compensation is not affected by the characteristics of the 
defendant, only by the characteristics of the victim. Table 4, column 1, shows that the amount of 
compensation is not statistically different when the defendant does not have a Don honorific title. 
Compensation is also not affected when the defendant is a recidivist, as shown in column 4. The amount 
of water stolen is not correlated with the defendant's observable characteristics. This finding is consistent 
with compensation being equal to damage inflicted rather than a punishment based on the crime. 
However, when the defendant is poor and the victim is wealthy, the compensation is about 25 pesetas 
higher (column 3). Table 2 shows that a crime is more likely to occur during a dry month. However, the 
compensation is not affected by the dryness of the month. 
The amount of the compensation is highly correlated with the victim's characteristics.  The 
compensation is significantly higher when the victim has a Don honorific tittle (24.99 pesetas in column 
2). Table 1 shows that the average compensation is 11.07 pesetas. This means that, when the victim is 
wealthy, the compensation is more than twice the average compensation. Again, one should not interpret 
this as Dons being forced to pay larger compensations. Compensations represent the estimated value of 
the water stolen, and the judge has no discretion over that amount. We interpret this correlation as 
characteristic of the crime. That is, when farmers steal from a wealthy farmer, they tend to steal about 25 
pesetas more in terms of the value of the water, than when they steal from a poor farmer. This result 
suggests that when given the chance, farmers steal as much water as they can from a wealthy farmer. This 
is not true when stealing from poor farmers, however. This disparity could result from farmers' restraint 
from stealing too much water from poor farmers, or from wealthy farmers' larger plots, which require 
more water. This result reinforces the ones in Table 3, where fines are lower for poor defendants and 
wealthy victims (column 3). Not only does the poor farmer pay a lower fine when stealing from a wealthy 
one. The lower fine is for a crime involving a more valuable bounty. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We investigate the roles of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity in the 
determination of crime and welfare using a novel dataset of trials from a self-governed community of 
farmers. The system analyzed combined protection of water and land property rights, with a punishment 
system that minimized crime while creating insurance of last resort. We believe that the results here 
apply to other irrigation communities. The results help explain the role that punishment played in the 
survival of self-governed irrigation communities more generally. 
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Punishment progressivity and information about individual characteristics are usually absent in 
criminology analysis of self-governed communities. We studied a particular historical setting, where 
judges impose low punishments for first time offenders based on individual characteristics, and recidivists 
are punished harsher than first time offenders. We showed that this punishment system is efficient in a 
model with a transitory individual state related to the need of stealing, and a persistent individual state 
related to the propensity of stealing, or greed. Because water was allocated using an auction, in the 
absence of frictions the allocation would be efficient. In the presence of frictions, we show that the system 
of punishment partially alleviated the inefficiency created by them. We reconciled the Beckerian insight 
that harsh punishments deter crime with the documented light punishments and low crime rates in self-
governed irrigation communities. Average punishments are low because they are a weighted average of 
several small punishments for first time offenders, and a few large punishments for recidivists. Crime 
rates are low because the punishments for recidivists are harsh. This is a result from the particularities in 
our empirical setting. Due to volatile weather, the probability that a poor farmer is in need to steal water is 
high in the future. Losing the option value to steal in the future acts as a harsh punishment, thus deterring 
crime. 
We showed that in our context, a positive amount of crime is socially efficient. It is optimal for 
farmers who are liquidity constrained and in need of water, to steal water from a neighbor, thus 
preventing their own trees from dying. However, whether a farmer is in need of water is not perfectly 
observable by the judge. Therefore, the judges trade off false positives and negatives, resulting in 
punishments that are neither maximal nor zero. Our empirical analysis showed that the judges in Mula 
trade off crime deterrence and water insurance. They made efficient use of information regarding the 
crime, the criminal, and the victim, to determine the optimal punishment. In our framework, legal 
flexibility allows judges to use their “judgment” and the information available to determine the 
punishment in each case. Judges used this flexibility to provide insurance of last resort to farmers, in a 
context of imperfect financial markets. 
One important insight from our paper is that low punishments, typically viewed as evidence of 
suboptimal contracts, were intended to increase efficiency, not equality. The disadvantageous treatment 
of wealthy farmers arises as a consequence of efficiency: their marginal utility of water is lower, the 
damage of their crime is larger, and the damage (or marginal disutility) of stealing from them is lower. 
Similarly, the favorable treatment of poor farmers is a consequence of efficiency: allowing the poor 
farmer to steal water during the negative shock allows saving the farmers' trees. 
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Figure 1: Trials in self-governed communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Top: Caption of a trial for the Council of Good Men in Murcia. Bottom: Map of the area under study. 
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Figure 2: Sample of Sentence. 
“En la ciudad de Mula a doce de Agosto de mil 
novecientos seis; reunidos en mayoria los señores 
de la Directiva bajo la presidencia de D. Gines 
Meseguer Caballero, se procedio a examinar las 
de-nuncias producidas contra Antonio Perez 
Sanchez, Gabriel Zapata, Jose Maria Egea Piñero, 
Juan Francisco Huescar, y Jose Baigal, por haber 
sus-traido agua de la acequia-mayor, para plantar 
patatas, valiendose de caballerias, hombre y mu-
jeres provistas de cantaros. Despues que la Junta 
se entero de las excusas expuestas por los denunci-
ados, acordo imponer a cada uno de ellos la multa 
de dos pesetas, por ser la primera vez que han in-
currido en dicha falta, previniendoles que si rein-
ciden en lo sucesivo, la multa sera mayor.” 
 
“In the city of Mula, on August 12, 1906; with the 
majority of the board under the presidency of Don 
Gines Meseguer Caballero, they proceeded to 
examine the accusations against Antonio Perez 
Sanchez, Gabriel Zapata, Jose Maria Egea Piñero, 
Juan Francisco Huescar, and Jose Baigal, because 
they stole water from the main canal, to irrigate 
potatoes, using horses, men and women with jugs. 
After the board learned about the excuses claimed 
by the defendants, they agreed to impose a fine of 
two pesetas, to each of them, because it was the 
first time that they incurred in such a misdemeanor, 
warning them that if they recidivate in the future, 
the fine would be larger.” 
 
 
Notes:  Left: Caption of the first page of a sentence, corresponding to a single trial, on August 12, 1906.  Right: Transcription in 
the original Spanish and authors' translation of the first paragraph. 
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Figure 3: Seasonality of Auctions and Guilty Dons. 
 
Panel A. Crimes: Seasonality of crimes where the defendant had Don honorific title. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Trials where there was an auction the previous week. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data using the 174 trials where the defendant was found guilty. Panel A shows the number of crimes (subset of trials 
where the defendant was found guilty), where the victim had a Don honorific title (dark) or not (light), for each month. Panel B 
shows the number of trials where there was an auction the previous week, for each month. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics. 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
      
Guilty 0.62 0.49 0 1 282 
Dry month 0.81 0.39 0 1 282 
Victim is Don 0.26 0.44 0 1 282 
Defendant is Don 0.15 0.36 0 1 282 
Auction Dummy 0.64 0.48 0 1 282 
      
Fine 6.49 10.12 0 65 174 
Compensation 11.07 27.23 0 240.75 174 
Recidivist 0.04 0.20 0 1 174 
 
Notes: Summary statistics for selected variables. Guilty is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the defendant was found guilty 
during the trial. Fine is the amount of fine imposed on guilty defendants. Dry Month is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
alleged crime was committed during a dry month, from May to October, and 0 otherwise. Victim is Don is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the victim of the crime was an individual referred to as Don, and 0 otherwise. Defendant is Don is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the defendant was an individual referred to as Don, and 0 otherwise. Auction Dummy is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if there was an auction in the week that the crime was reported or 0 otherwise. Compensation is the amount that the 
defendant paid to the victim as recompense for the loss suffered; it represents the value of the water stolen. Recidivist is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the farmer who committed the crime had also committed a crime in the past, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 2: Probability of Being Guilty and Farmers' Characteristics 
 
Dep. variable: guilty (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Defendant not Don -0.068 -0.220 -0.086 -0.220 -0.068 0.149 -0.074 0.149 
 (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080) (0.212) (0.081) (0.212) 
(Defendant not Don) ´   0.222  0.212  -0.247  -0.255 
(dry month)  (0.079)  (0.082)  (0.194)  (0.193) 
(Defendant not Don) ´    0.092 0.040   0.029 0.038 
(victim Don) ´   (0.074) (0.079)   (0.080) (0.079) 
(dry month)         
Auction dummy     0.075 0.077 0.074 0.076 
     (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Dry month     0.239 0.454 0.232 0.454 
     (0.076) (0.179) (0.078) (0.179) 
         
Number of trials 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.023 0.006 0.024 0.038 0.041 0.038 0.042 
 
Notes: All specifications are probit regressions, and include a constant that is not reported. Marginal effects are reported. 
Dependent variable is Guilty, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the defendant was found guilty during the trial. Standard errors 
corresponding to the marginal effects are in parenthesis. We obtain similar results using logit specifications. See Table 1 for 
variable definitions. 
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Table 3: Fines and Farmers' Characteristics 
Dep. variable: Fine (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Defendant not Don -5.351  -4.066  -5.693  -4.433  
 (1.579)  (1.579)  (1.520)  (1.519)  
Victim Don  -4.534    -4.440   
  (1.390)    (1.343)   
(Defendant not Don) ´   -4.778    -4.654  
(victim Don)   (1.412)    (1.353)  
Recidivist    15.067    14.651 
    (2.872)    (2.828) 
Auction dummy     -4.606 -4.348 -4.536 -4.397 
     (1.237) (1.248) (1.199) (1.196) 
Dry month     -1.738 -1.500 -1.663 0.314 
     (1.734) (1.746) (1.682) (1.700) 
         
Number of trials 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R2 0.063 0.058 0.121 0.138 0.147 0.132 0.203 0.203 
 
Notes: Sample restricted to trials where the defendant was found guilty. All specifications are OLS regressions, and include a 
constant not reported. Dependent variable is Fine, the amount of fine, measured in pesetas imposed to defendants when they 
were found guilty. Standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4: Compensations and Farmers' Characteristics. 
 
Dep. variable: Compensation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Defendant not Don 7.321  0.456  7.766  0.862  
 (5.528)  (5.277)  (5.545)  (5.290)  
Victim Don  24.990    25.360   
(Defendant not Don) ´ 
 (4.491)    (4.483)   
  25.524    25.495  
(victim Don)   (4.716)    (4.713)  
Recidivist    -10.676    -8.846 
    (10.506)    (10.709) 
Auction dummy     -3.177 -4.154 -3.559 -3.390 
     (4.511) (4.163) (4.178) (4.527) 
Dry month     8.666 9.326 8.259 7.075 
     (6.325) (5.826) (5.858) (6.438) 
         
Number of trials 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R2 0.010 0.153 0.155 0.006 0.022 0.168 0.166 0.015 
 
Notes: Sample restricted to trials where the defendant was found guilty. All specifications are OLS regressions, and include a 
constant not reported. Dependent variable is compensation, the amount that the defendant must pay to compensate the victim 
for the loss inflicted; it represents the value of the water stolen. Standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions. 
 
 
